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Dynamic Pricing and Capacity Allocation of
UAV-provided Mobile Services
Xuehe Wang and Lingjie Duan
Abstract—Due to its agility and mobility, the unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) is a promising technology to provide high-quality
mobile services (e.g., fast Internet access, edge computing, and
local caching) to ground users. Major Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) want to enable UAV-provided services (UPS) to improve
and enrich the current mobile services for additional profit. This
profit-maximization problem is not easy as the UAV has limited
energy storage and needs to fly closely to serve users, requiring
an optimal energy allocation for balancing both hovering time
and service capacity. When hovering in a hotspot, how the UAV
should dynamically price its capacity-limited UPS according to
randomly arriving users with private service valuations is another
question. We prove that the UAV should ask for a higher price
if the leftover hovering time is longer or its service capacity is
smaller, and its expected profit approaches to that under complete
user information if the hovering time is sufficiently large. As
the hotspot’s user occurrence rate increases, a shorter hovering
time or a larger service capacity should be allocated. Finally,
when the UAV faces multiple hotspot candidates with different
user occurrence rates and flying distances, we prove that it is
optimal to deploy the UAV to serve a single hotspot. With multiple
UAVs, however, this result can be reversed with UAVs’ forking
deployment to different hotspots.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the demand for mobile services increases exponentially,
it is imperative for the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to
improve existing services’ capacity and coverage and provide
more customized services for profit maximizing. Due to its
agility and mobility, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
emerges as a promising vehicular technology to provide
value-added mobile services (e.g., fast Internet access, edge
computing, and local caching) to ground users. For example,
AT&T has designed a Flying COW to beam high-throughput
wireless coverage to the crowds in sports stadiums [1]. By
endowing with edge computing capability, the UAV can be
also used to offer computation offloading services to mobile
users with limited terminal processing capability [2]. The
cache-enabled UAV is also implemented recently to improve
the quality-of-experience of mobile devices by caching and
distributing the popular content to them [3]. Major ISPs want
to enable such UAV-provided services (UPS) to improve and
enrich their mobile services for additional profit. For example,
Verizon hired a specialized drone company Skyward to provide
compatible value-added services to its users [4]. The global
revenue of UPS is expected to increase from $792 million in
2017 to $12.6 billion by 2025 [5].
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Fig. 1: Three-stage UPS provision of the UAV firm for profit-
maximization.
The literature focuses on the technological issues of en-
abling UPS such as exploiting air-to-ground communication
to enlarge wireless coverage and addressing UAV energy
constraints. For example, [6] analyzes the optimal operating
altitude for a UAV’s maximum wireless coverage by consid-
ering the trade-off between the opportunity of line-of-sight
transmission and signal attenuation. In [7], an energy-aware
UAV path planning algorithm is proposed to minimize energy
consumption of covering users in a specific area. In the UAV-
provided edge computing application, [2] studies the optimiza-
tion of the UAV’s trajectory and computing offloading under
its energy constraint. As for local caching application, in [3]
the optimal UAV’s location and the content to cache are jointly
investigated according to the users’ content request distribution
and their mobility patterns. In [8], two fast UAV deployment
problems are studied for optimal wireless coverage. [9], [10]
further study the UAV placement games for best serving all the
users while ensuring all selfish users’ truthfulness in reporting
their locations. [11] focuses on adapting the UAV deployment
to the spatial randomness of mobile users in order to maximize
the average throughput of all users in the uplink information
transmission.
Still, the economic issues of UPS for serving mobile users
are largely overlooked in the literature, hindering the suc-
cessful development of UPS in the long run. As the UAV’s
hovering in the air and its service (e.g., computing and
caching) provision to ground users are both energy-consuming,
a longer hovering time helps meet more demands yet leaving
less energy for servicing them. How to balance the hovering
time and service capacity under the limited energy budget
is critical to ensure the economic viability of UPS. Further,
when hovering in a hotspot for a given time period, how to
dynamically price the capacity-limited UPS to ground users for
profit-maximization is another issue. This is challenging under
incomplete information about the mobile users’ randomness
in arriving and their private valuations of buying UPS. What’s
more, when facing multiple hotspot candidates with different
user occurrence rates and flying distances, the optimal de-
ployment of multiple UAVs to cooperatively serve the chosen
hotspots needs to be studied. This paper proposes a three-stage
UPS provision model to study these economic issues as shown
in Fig. 1: first on multiple UAVs’ deployment to cooperatively
cover heterogeneous hotspots, then on energy allocation of
each UAV to balance hovering time and service capacity for
its chosen hotspot to deploy, and finally the dynamic UPS
pricing for each UAV over its hovering time. These three stages
following time sequence are inter-dependent for maximizing
the UPS profit and we will apply backward induction for
analyzing them.
It should be noted that in the literature there are some related
works studying the pricing issues for resource constrained
wireless networks (e.g., [12], [13], [14], [15]). For example,
[12] discusses both the static and dynamic pricing schemes
for a wireless network, depending on whether the network
can adapt to the service requirements of their subscribers. An
optimal pricing for bandwidth sharing is proposed in [13] for
an integrated network using different wireless technologies.
[14] studies dynamic WiFi pricing for a fixed user over time
under incomplete information of the user’s service valuation
and utilities. In the broader literature of economics and oper-
ations research, there are also some related works about the
dynamic admission control and pricing of generic services for
users under incomplete demand information ([16],[17],[18]).
However, these works assume a fixed service capacity and
do not consider users’ randomness in arrivals, while in this
paper studies a more difficult scenario that each UAV has
interchangeable energy capacities for hovering and servicing
to further balance in practice and the mobile users are also
randomly moving on the ground.
Our key novelty and main contributions are summarized as
follows.
• Economics of UAV-provided mobile services: To our best
knowledge, this paper is the first work studying the
economics of UAV-provided services (UPS) provision,
including the interdependent UAV-network deployment,
capacity allocation and finally dynamic service pricing for
UPS profit maximization in Fig. 1. By applying backward
induction, we first analyze each UAV’s dynamic pricing
under user incomplete information for a given hovering
time at a given hotspot deployment, then the optimal
trade-off between its hovering time and service capacity
at a given hotspot, and finally deployment of multiple
cooperative UAVs to cover heterogeneous hotspots.
• Dynamic UPS pricing under incomplete information
(Section III): Under the incomplete information regarding
users’ random arrivals and private service valuations, we
propose an optimal dynamic pricing scheme for each
UAV and prove that the UAV should ask for a higher
UPS price if its leftover hovering time is longer or its
service capacity is smaller. Its expected profit approaches
to that under complete user information if the hovering
time is sufficiently large. We also show that the UAV
may take advantage of a large variance of users’ valuation
distribution.
• Optimal energy allocation to balance hovering time and
service capacity (Section IV): Though a longer hovering
time ensures a higher service price under incomplete
information, it leaves a smaller service capacity under the
total energy budget, the UAV should balance its hovering
time and service capacity to maximize its profit for pro-
viding UPS. To characterize the tradeoff, we develop an
optimal threshold-based capacity allocation policy which
is easy to implement. We show that as the hotspot’s user
occurrence rate increases, a smaller hovering time or a
larger service capacity should be allocated.
• Cooperative UAVs’ deployment to heterogeneous hotspots
(Section V): We study the deployment of multiple cooper-
ative UAVs owned by a UAV company to heterogeneous
potential hotspots for maximizing the total UPS profit.
A hotspot’s high user occurrence rate helps ensure a
large demand for UPS yet its flying distance should
not be far for a UAV to reach under energy constraint.
We aim to reach the best trade-off between different
hotspots’ user occurrence rates and flying distances for
UAV deployment. We prove that it is optimal for a
single UAV to only serve one hotspot. However, when
we have multiple UAVs for deployment, they should
fork to serve different hotspots especially when hotspots
are more symmetric or the UAV number is large. When
multiple UAVs are deployed to the same hotspot, they
can cooperatively pool their service capacities yet waste
more energy in hovering at the same time.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
For maximizing the UAV company’s profit, we propose a
three-stage UPS provision model to study the UAVs’ optimal
deployment, capacity allocation and dynamic pricing as shown
in Fig. 1. In Stage I , we deploy a numberN of identical UAVs
from the UAV station to M potential heterogeneous hotspots
to cooperatively serve users there.1 Fig. 2 shows an example
of deploying N = 5 UAVs to M = 5 heterogeneous hotspots.
Each hotspotm’s user occurrence rate and flying distance from
the UAV station are denoted as αm and Dm,m = 1, ...,M ,
respectively. Users’ random arrivals at a hotspot in a discrete
1In practice, most users are clustered in hotspots (e.g., shopping malls and
residential areas). Actually, for any unpopular place, we can still model it as
a hotspot here, by updating its low user occurrence rate and its flying distance
for the UAV to reach.
Fig. 2: An example of N = 5 UAVs’ deployment to M = 5
potential hotspots with different user occurrence rates αm’s
and flying distances Dm’s, followed by the dynamic pricing
with service capacity k in the hovering period T for each UAV
at its hotspot. The number in red circle indicates how many
UAVs are assigned to the corresponding hotspot.
time horizon and each time slot’s duration are properly se-
lected such that there is at most one user occurrence at a
time. Here αm also tells the probability of having a user’s
occurrence in each time slot at hotspot m. Each user has a
one-time-slot service session with the UAV and then leaves
the hotspot.2
In Stage II , given an individual UAV’s energy storage B
upon arrival at its deployed hotspot, this UAV should decide
the energy allocation to hovering time T and service capacity k
with T + ck ≤ B, where c > 0 is the energy consumption for
serving a user (in relative sense to the energy consumption
per unit hovering time). Both T and k are integers, telling
how many time slots for hovering and how many users to
serve, respectively. If the UAV hovers longer, it may encounter
more users and charge higher prices under user incomplete
information, yet the final number k of users it can serve
decreases given the total energy budget B.
In Stage III , given hovering time T and service capacity
k for this hotspot, our objective is to maximize the UAV’s
expected profitRk(T ) at this hotspot by designing the dynamic
pricing {p1(t), ..., pk(t)|t = 1, ..., T } in the discrete time
horizon as shown in the lower part of Fig. 2, where pj(t), j =
1, ..., k, is the price for selling the UPS to the jth-to-last user at
t time units before the end of hovering/selling period T . Note
that t = 0 (or t = T ) is the end (beginning) of the hovering
interval and p1(t) (or pk(t)) is the price for serving the last
(first) user. For simplicity, we will use “t time units before the
end of hovering period T ” and “time t” interchangeably in the
rest of the paper. A user (if occurs) will accept the price if his
service valuation v is greater than the price asked by the UAV.
2Our analysis can also be extended to the case that a user stays in service
for more than one time slot.
It is assumed that there is no possibility to recall the users and
they may already leave. The users’ valuations of the UPS are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a
probability density function (PDF) f(v), v ∈ [a, b]. Though
all potential users’ valuations follow the same distribution,
their realized valuations are different in general. Under the
incomplete information, the UAV does not know the user
occurrence for UPS over time t or the user’s private service
valuation v. It only knows the user occurrence probability in
each time slot and the valuation distribution f(v).
For economic purpose, we want to maximize the total
UAVs’ final profit in the three-stage UPS provision model
under their energy budgets. In the following, we will use
backward induction to first analyze the optimal dynamic
pricing for each UAV in Stage III with given service capacity
and hovering time at a given hotspot, then the energy allocation
for this UAV at the given hotspot in Stage II , and finally the
UAVs’ optimal deployment to all possible hotspots in Stage
I .
III. DYNAMIC UPS PRICING UNDER INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION IN STAGE III
In Stage III , each UAV’s hovering time T and service
capacity k are given for its deployed hotspot m. The UAV
at this hotspot has probability αm or simply α of meeting a
user request in each time slot. Here we skip the subscript as
the analysis holds for a UAV at any hotspot. The UAV should
decide the dynamic pricing pj(t) at t time slots before the
end of hovering interval T given any leftover service capacity
j, j = 1, ..., k as shown in Fig. 2. Note that fixed pricing rate
is not optimal and is just a special case of our dynamic pricing
here. It is possible to deploy more than one UAV at the same
hotspot and their cooperative pricing is studied later in Section
V.
Before studying the UAV’s optimal pricing strategy for any
service capacity k, we first consider the case of k = 1. That
is, the UAV can only serve one user finally. By announcing
price p1(t) at time t, a user (if appears with probability α) will
accept and pay the price if his service valuation v is greater,
i.e., v ≥ p1(t). Given the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of his service valuation F (v), the probability that a user
will appear and accept the price is α(1−F (p1(t))). Then, the
UAV’s expected total profit in the remaining t time slots is
R1(t) =αp1(t)(1− F (p1(t)))
+R1(t− 1)(1− α(1− F (p1(t)))).
(1)
We then consider the case of k = 2. After successfully
serving the first user and using up one service capacity, the
profit analysis of the case k = 1 in (1) can be applied for
subsequently serving the second user. Note that the expected
total profit received from the second user at t time slots is
R1(t). By successfully serving the first user at price p2(t) at
time t, the UAV’s total profit at time t is p2(t) + R1(t − 1).
Otherwise, the UAV will keep R2(t − 1) with two service
quota for the remaining t − 1 time slots. Then, the expected
profit with service capacity k = 2 at time slot t is
R2(t) =α(p2(t) +R1(t− 1))(1 − F (p2(t)))
+R2(t− 1)(1− α(1 − F (p2(t)))).
(2)
Similar to the above analysis, for the general k ≥ 2 case,
the expected total profit at time t can be derived recursively
as
Rk(t) =α(pk(t) +Rk−1(t− 1))(1 − F (pk(t)))
+Rk(t− 1)(1− α(1− F (pk(t)))),
(3)
where Rk(0) = 0 due to zero remaining hovering time and
R0(t) = 0 due to zero leftover service capacity.
By taking the derivative of Rk(t) with respect to pk(t), the
optimal price pk(t) satisfies
dRk(t)
dpk(t)
=α
(
1− F (pk(t))− f(pk(t))
×
(
pk(t)− (Rk(t− 1)−Rk−1(t− 1))
))
= 0.
(4)
According to (4), it is easy to check that pk(t) ≥ Rk(t− 1)−
Rk−1(t−1). We can also derive the following result from (4).
Proposition 3.1: For ∀t ∈ {1, · · · , T } and k ≥ 1, we have
Rk(t) ≥ Rk(t − 1). Moreover, if t < k, Rk(t) = Rt(t), and
otherwise kR1(⌊
t
k
⌋) ≤ Rk(t).
Intuitively, if the remaining hovering time t is less than the
maximum number of users k that the UAV can serve, i.e., t <
k, the UAV can at most serve t users (one per each time slot)
and the extra service capacity is wasted, thus Rk(t) = Rt(t)
and the price pk(t) at time t < k does not exist. If the UAV has
reasonable leftover time t to sell k (i.e., t ≥ k), it is better to
optimize its expected profit Rk(t) via jointly pricing k service
capacities over t time slots, rather than independently pricing
for each service capacity with separate selling time ⌊ t
k
⌋. This
implies that Rk(t) concavely increases with k and t.
In the following, we assume the distributions of the users’
service valuations are regular, which is widely adopted in the
realm of mechanism design [19].
Assumption 3.1: φ(v) = v− 1−F (v)
f(v) is an increasing function
of v, where F (v) and f(v) are the CDF and PDF of each user’s
valuation v, respectively.
Regularity holds for many distributions such as uniform,
normal, exponential and Rayleigh distributions.
Proposition 3.2: For ∀t ∈ {1, · · · , T } and k ≥ 1, Algorithm
1 optimally returns the dynamic pricing scheme with compu-
tation complexity O(kT ). Especially, when k = 1, the optimal
price p1(t) is a non-decreasing function of leftover time t and
mean user occurrence rate α in the hotspot.
The proof of Proposition 3.2 is given in Appendix A.
In Algorithm 1, we first compute the optimal price pj(t)
according to (4), which is a function of Rj−1(t−1) and Rj(t−
1) with initial conditions R1(0) = 0 and R0(t) = 0. Note that
the price pj(t) at time t ≤ j− 1 does not exist as the leftover
time slots t is not enough to serve the jth users. Finally, we can
obtain the expected profit Rj(t) based on pj(t). Proposition
3.2 also shows that the UAV should ask for a higher price if
it has more leftover time t for encountering more users or a
Algorithm 1 UAV’s dynamic pricing for serving k users in
hovering time T
1: for j = 1 to k do
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: if t <= j − 1 then
4: Rj(t) = Rt(t);
5: else
6: compute pj(t) as the unique solution to (4);
7: update Rj(t) according to pj(t) and (3);
8: end if
9: return pj(t), Rj(t)
10: end for
11: end for
12: return {p1(t), ..., pk(t)|t = 1, · · · , T } and Rk(T )
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Fig. 3: Optimal price pk(t) at each time t versus the service
capacity k for exponential distributions of users’ service
valuations when α = 0.8, λ = 1 and T = 10.
larger user demand (characterized by a higher user occurrence
rate α). Actually, for general k, we can numerically show that
the optimal price pk(t) has the following properties (see Fig.
3):
• For any given t, the optimal price pk(t) decreases with k,
as the UAV has more service capacity supply k to meet
the users’ demand.
• For any given k, the optimal price pk(t) increases with
t, as the UAV has more leftover time for encountering
more users.
A. Continuous-time Relaxation For More Tractable Analysis
In the discrete time model as in Fig. 2, we can only use
a recursive and numerical way to derive Rk(t) and pk(t)
according to (3) and (4). To obtain more analytical results
for dynamic pricing design, we next apply continuous-time
relaxation on the discrete time model. Assume users arrive
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α′. Denote
the time duration of each time slot for the discrete time model
as ε in Fig. 2. To keep the same user occurrence rate α per
time slot as in the discrete time case, we have εα′+ o(ε) = α
as ε → 0. Similar to the analysis of the discrete time case
in (3), as ε → 0, the expected total profit that the UAV can
obtain at continuous time t+ ε is
Rk(t+ ε) = α
′
∫ t+ε
t
(pk(x) +Rk−1(x))(1 − F (pk(x)))dx
+Rk(t)(1 − α
′
∫ t+ε
t
(1− F (pk(x)))dx) + o(ε).
(5)
Note that Rk(0) = 0. According to (5), the UAV’s expected
total profit with service capacity k at time t can be derived as
Rk(t) = α
′
∫ t
0
(pk(x)+Rk−1(x)−Rk(x))(1−F (pk(x)))dx.
(6)
To ensure positive profit, pk(x) ≥ Rk(x) − Rk−1(x). The
optimal price pk(t) that maximizes the expected profit Rk(t)
is simplified to
pk(t) = arg max
p≥Rk(t)−Rk−1(t)
(p+Rk−1(t)−Rk(t))(1−F (p)).
(7)
To analytically obtain the expected profit, we further con-
sider the case that the users’ i.i.d. service valuations follow
exponential distributions, i.e., F (v) = 1 − e−λv.3 Then, by
solving (7), the optimal price pk(t) is
pk(t) =
1
λ
+Rk(t)−Rk−1(t), (8)
which is greater than the mean valuation 1
λ
by considering the
future pricing opportunity characterized by Rk(t)−Rk−1(t) ≥
0. Insert (8) into (6), the expected profit for serving k users
in total hovering time T can be derived in closed-form, given
by
Rk(T ) =
1
λ
log
( k∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′T
e
)i
)
. (9)
From (8) and (9), we can obtain the closed-form dynamic price
at time t ∈ [0, T ] explicitly as
pk(t) =
1
λ
+
1
λ
log
(∑k
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i∑k−1
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i
)
. (10)
Proposition 3.3: The optimal expected profit Rk(T ) in (9)
concavely increases with both k and T , respectively. Further,
the optimal price pk(t) in (10) increases with t and convexly
decreases with k.
The proof of Proposition 3.3 is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 3.3 shows that the growth rate of the expected
profit decreases with service capacity k given the fixed hov-
ering time T . This is because the partitioned hovering time
T
k
for pricing an individual service capacity decreases with k
in average sense. Similarly, the growth rate of the expected
profit decreases with hovering time T given the fixed service
capacity k. We can also see that Proposition 3.3 is consistent
with the numerical results under discrete-time case in Fig. 3.
Moreover, the optimal price increases faster as k decreases
due to the scarce service capacity to sell within t time period.
Thus, pk(t) convexly decreases with k.
3The analysis method also holds for other continuous distributions though
the analysis is move involved without closed-form.
Fig. 4: Ratio of the expected profits under incomplete informa-
tion and complete information Rk(T )/Rˆk(T ) versus hovering
time T and service capacity k.
B. Comparison with complete information benchmark
We have finished analyzing the dynamic pricing under
incomplete information above. We wonder the performance
gap with ideally complete information, where the UAV can
perfectly observe a user’s service valuation v upon his im-
mediate arrival. Still, the UAV cannot observe future users’
arrival pattern or valuations, otherwise, the analysis is trivial
and the result is impractical. According to the threshold-
based assignment policies developed for complete information
in [16] under continuous-time case, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.4: For k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, limT→∞
Rk(T )
Rˆk(T )
= 1,
where Rk(T ) and Rˆk(T ) are the expected profits under incom-
plete and complete information for exponential distribution of
users service valuations, respectively.
Actually, for any finite k < ∞, we can iteratively obtain
Rˆk(T ) in non-closed-form according to [16]. Then we can
also show the convergence of
Rk(T )
Rˆk(T )
to 1 in a numerical way.
As shown in Fig. 4, Rk(t) approaches Rˆk(t) if the hovering
time T is sufficiently large. Moreover, Rk(t) converges faster
to Rˆk(t) as the service capacity k decreases. This is because,
as k decreases, the partitioned hovering time ⌊T
k
⌋ for pricing
an individual service capacity increases in average sense and
is easier to become sufficient.
We also wonder how the expected profit changes with the
user variance given fixed mean for the distribution of each
user’s service valuation. For the uniform distribution’s CDF
F (v) = v−a
b−a , v ∈ [a, b], Fig. 5 shows the maximum profits
under both complete and incomplete information, and the
former is greater. When the hovering time T is big (e.g.,
T = 12), the expected profits under incomplete and complete
information always increase with the variance. This is because
the users’ maximum service valuation b increases due to the
increased variance and the UAV has enough time to wait for
the user with higher service valuation to pay. However, when
0 1.33 5.33 12 21.33 33.33
Variance (b-a)
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Fig. 5: Expected profits under complete information and
incomplete information versus the variance with fixed mean
10 under uniform distribution.
the hovering time T is small (e.g., T = 3), the expected profits
first decrease with the variance due to the more information
loss and then increase due to the larger upper bound b to
exploit. Note that even for the complete information, the
UAV still has some information loss as it can only observe
clearly an immediate arrival’s valuation rather than any future
information.
IV. UAV’S ENERGY ALLOCATION IN HOVERING TIME
AND SERVICE CAPACITY IN STAGE II
Based on the analysis of optimal pricing in Section III, a
longer hovering time T results in a higher service price at
the cost of smaller service capacity k. Therefore, in Stage II
the UAV under the total energy budget B should balance T
and k optimally for profit maximization. Its optimal energy
allocation problem at the given hotspot is
max
k,T∈Z+
Rk(T ), (11)
s.t.
T + ck ≤ B, (12)
where Rk(T ) is returned by Algorithm 1 for discrete-time
case, and B can be viewed as the maximum hovering time if
the UAV does not use any energy to serve any user.
At the optimality, (12) is tight to use up all the budget and
the problem can be rewritten as
max
k∈Z+
Rk(B − ck). (13)
Recall that ∀t < k,Rk(t) = Rt(t) in Proposition 3.1 and
the UAV would not set k to be larger than the maximum time,
i.e., k ≤ B − ck. Thus, integer decision k is upper bounded
by ⌊ B1+c⌋. By using Algorithm 1 for any k ∈ {1, ..., ⌊
B
1+c⌋},
we can recursively calculate the corresponding expected profit
Rk(B−ck). Then, the UAV compares and chooses the best k
∗
with maximal expected profit, i.e., k∗ = argmaxkRk(B−ck).
Fig. 6 shows a numerical example for uniform distribution
of users’ service valuations under the discrete-time case.
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Fig. 6: Expected profit versus service capacity k for uniform
service valuation distributions when B = 15 and c = 3. Here,
integer decision k is upper bounded by ⌊ B1+c⌋ = 3.
• For low user occurrence rate α, it is better to only serve
one user, i.e., k∗ = 1. It is worthwhile for the UAV to
hover the longest possible time to encounter a user.
• For medium user occurrence rate α, it is easier for the
UAV to encounter more users and it should choose k∗ ∈
{2, · · · , ⌊ B
c+1⌋ − 1}, telling an optimal balance between
encountered demand and service capacity supply.
• For high user occurrence rate α, the UAV will meet
many users and it will choose to serve as many users
as possible, i.e., k∗ = ⌊ B
c+1⌋.
To analytically obtain the energy allocation policy, similar
to Section III-A, we apply continuous-time relaxation, where
the maximum service capacity is ⌊B
c
⌋. Recall Proposition 3.3
shows that Rk(T ) concavely increases with both k and T and
α′ is the arrival rate of Poisson process under the continuous-
time model. Based on this result, we successfully develop an
optimal energy allocation policy by assuming that the users’
service valuations follow exponential distributions.
Theorem 4.1: The optimal service capacity k∗ depends on
the user occurrence rate and is given as follows.
• In the low user occurrence regime (α′ ≤ 2ce(B−2c)2 ), the
UAV will decide k∗ = 1 for serving one user only.
• For medium user occurrence regime ( 2ce(B−2c)2 < α
′ <
α¯′), the UAV will decide
k∗ = arg max
k∈Z+
k∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′(B − ck)
e
)i ∈ {2, · · · , ⌊
B
c
⌋−1}.
(14)
• For high user occurrence regime (α′ ≥ α¯′), the UAV will
decide k∗ = ⌊B
c
⌋ for serving as many users as possible,
where α¯′ is the unique solution to
α′
e⌊B
c
⌋!
(B − c⌊
B
c
⌋)⌊
B
c
⌋ −
⌊B
c
⌋−1∑
i=1
(
e
α′
)⌊
B
c
⌋−i−1 1
i!
×
(
(B − c(⌊
B
c
⌋ − 1))i − (B − c⌊
B
c
⌋)i
)
= 0.
(15)
The optimal hovering time is T ∗ = B − ck∗.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is given in Appendix C.
Note that the high user occurrence regime may not always
exist since α¯′ as the solution to (15) can be infinity. It happens
when B
c
is an integer and the hovering time B − ck∗ = B −
cB
c
is zero. In this case, we only have low and medium user
occurrence regimes with k∗ < B
c
.
The policy shown in Theorem 4.1 is threshold-based and
easy to implement. As the total energy budget B increases, the
low user occurrence regime is less likely to happen and the
optimal service capacity k∗ in (14) increases with B and user
occurrence rate α′. This is because the UAV has more energy
budget and thus it is better for it to serve more users. Moreover,
we can see that Theorem 4.1’s result under the continuous-time
model is consistent with Fig. 6 under the discrete-time model.
V. OPTIMAL UAV DEPLOYMENT IN STAGE I
GivenM hotspots with heterogeneous user occurrence rates
αm’s and distances Dm’s with m ∈ {1, ...,M} from the UAV
station in Fig. 2, we now study how to deploy N UAVs to
such hotspots. Here each UAV has an identical initial energy
budget B0 fully charged at the UAV station. In the following,
we will analyze the optimal UAV deployment strategy for a
single UAV first and then extend to multiple cooperative UAVs.
A. Deployment of a Single UAV to Heterogeneous Hotspots
Given a single UAV’s route going through M ′ ≤ M
hotspots in sequence H = {H1, H2, · · · , HM ′}, the route
distance is DH1 +
∑M ′−1
m=1 DHm,Hm+1 , where DHm,Hm+1 is
the flying distance from hotspot Hm to Hm+1. Given the
initial energy budget B0, the UAV spends energy traveling
in the route and its remaining energy profile is partitioned
among M ′ hotspots in the meantime for serving users there,
denoted as BM ′ = {BH1 , ..., BHM′ } with
∑M ′
m=1BHm =
B0−DH1−
∑M ′−1
m=1 DHm,Hm+1 . Here we normalize the energy
consumption per unit flying distance as one. Given energy
budgetBHm for hotspotHm, we still need to decide the energy
allocation to hovering time THm and service capacity kHm
in Stage II as well as the dynamic pricing during hovering
time THm in Stage III. Given routing strategy H and energy
partition BM ′ , based on (13) and Algorithm 1, we can obtain
the UAV’s overall expected profit by covering M ′ hotspots in
the whole route as
ΨH(H,BM ′) =
∑
Hm∈H
max
kHm∈Z
+
R
αHm
kHm
(BHm − ckHm), (16)
where R
αHm
kHm
(t) is the expected profit from hotspot Hm with
user occurrence rate αHm for serving kHm users at any time
t.
Still, the UAV needs to decide the route by considering∑M
M ′=1 C
M ′
M M
′! possibilities, where the UAV needs to first
choose M ′ out of M hotspots and each M ′ introduces M ′!
possible ordering sequences. Among these routing possibili-
ties, the UAV finds the optimal route with hotspot sequence
H and energy allocation BM ′ to maximize the overall expected
profit in (16).
This routing problem followed by energy allocation and
pricing is complicated and we can only solve in a numeri-
cal way. For analysis tractability, we still apply continuous-
time relaxation on the discrete-time horizon and analyze the
optimal UAV routing by assuming exponential distributions
for users’ service valuations. We also consider the situation
when the hovering time increases in the energy allocated to
the hotspot and the optimal service capacity increases in the
user occurrence rate for any given energy budget.4
Theorem 5.1: For any numberM of heterogeneous hotspots
distributed on the ground plane, it is optimal to deploy
the single UAV to only one hotspot denoted by m∗ =
argmaxm∈{1,...,M}maxkm R
αm
km
(B0 − Dm − ckm) without
serving any other hotspot in the route.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in Appendix D, and we
use the results of Theorem 4.1 in Stage II and (9) in Stage
III for the proof.
Theorem 5.1 tells that the single UAV will only serve the
first best hotspot with maximum individual expected profit.
If a part of energy budget is removed from serving the
first best hotspot to also serve the second best, the overall
profit decreases as the UAV’s marginal profit from serving the
second best hotspot is lower. Even if the UAV has to bypass a
hotspot before reaching the first best hotspot, it will not spend
any hovering time or service capacity there in the mean time.
Without loss of generality, we sort the M heterogeneous
hotspots according to their individual expected profits served
by the single UAV, i.e.,
Rα1k∗1
(B0−D1− ck
∗
1) ≥ · · · ≥ R
αM
k∗
M
(B0−DM − ck
∗
M ), (17)
where
k∗m = arg max
km∈Z+
Rαmkm (B0 −Dm − ckm), (18)
m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, and now hotspot 1 is the first best followed
by hotspot 2 and others. Other than profit maximization
objective, if the UAV further has the fairness commitment
constraint to serve a minimum number of hotspots with certain
hovering time in each, then we can still apply the sorting in
(17) for choosing profitable hotspots and deciding the energy
allocation differently among them.
B. Deployment of Multiple UAVs to Hotspots: Forking or Not
We are now ready to study how to assign multiple UAVs
simultaneously from the common UAV station to heteroge-
neous hotspots, and we want to answer the key question:
whether should all the UAVs still be deployed to the first best
hotspot only as in Theorem 5.1 or should they fork to serve
different hotspots.5 It is possible for more than one UAV to
cooperatively serve the same hotspot by “pooling” their service
capacities, e.g., when only one hotspot is close and reachable
within the energy budget B0. Given a number nm of UAVs
4Based on our exhaustive simulation, this assumption will not change the
result in Theorem 5.1.
5We assume UAVs are deployed at the same time to rapidly provide users
with UPS. Otherwise, for profit maximization purpose, all the UAVs will be
deployed one by one without any overlap to independently serve the first best
hotspot only, as in Theorem 5.1.
ϕ =
maxk1
∑k1
i=0
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D1−
ck1
N
)
e
)i −maxk1
∑k1
i=0
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D1−
ck1
N−1
)
e
)i
(maxk1
∑k1
i=0
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D1−
ck1
N−1
)
e
)i)(
∑k∗2
i=1
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D2−ck
∗
2)
e
)i)
. (23)
Algorithm 2 Deployment of N UAVs to M hotspots
1: for Any UAV deployment profile N do
2: for m = 1 to M do
3: if nm = 0 then
4: Rαmkm = 0
5: else
6: for km = 1 to ⌊
B0−Dm
1+ c
nm
⌋ do
7: for t = 1 to ⌊B0 −Dm −
ckm
nm
⌋ do
8: if t ≤ km − 1 then
9: Rαmkm (t) = R
αm
t (t)
10: else
11: compute pαmkm (t) as the unique solution to
(4);
12: update Rαmkm (t) according to p
αm
km
(t) and
(3);
13: end if
14: end for
15: return Rαmkm (⌊B0 −Dm −
ckm
nm
⌋)
16: end for
17: return maxkm R
αm
km
(⌊B0 −Dm −
ckm
nm
⌋)
18: end if
19: end for
20: return Φ(N )
21: end for
22: return N ∗ = argmaxN Φ(N )
cooperatively serving hotspot m,m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, they will
stay for the same amount of hovering time Tm due to their
symmetry. To keep the same energy consumption rates during
hovering, nm UAVs take turns to serve users. For example, in
the caching application, each UAV can sequentially distribute
1/nm segment of the requested popular file to the same user.
According to Theorem 5.1, the same group of nm UAVs will
only travel to one hotspot. It is possible that nm = 0 or 1. For
a particular hotspot m, the objective of nm cooperative UAVs
deployed there is to maximize their total expected profit,
max
km,Tm∈Z+
Rαmkm (Tm), (19)
s.t.
nmTm + ckm ≤ nm(B0 −Dm), (20)
where they decide total service capacity km jointly in Stage II
by pooling their residual energy nm(B0−Dm) upon reaching
hotspot m. The cooperation among UAVs helps pool their
service capacities to jointly decide pricing in Stage III , yet
they waste more energy in hovering at the same time.
At the optimality, (20) should be tight. Then, the overall
expected profit given the UAV deployment profile N =
{n1, ..., nM} to M hotspots with
∑M
m=1 nm = N is
Φ(N ) =
M∑
m=1
max
km∈Z+
Rαmkm (B0 −Dm −
ckm
nm
). (21)
Note that Rαmkm = 0 for hotspot m if nm = 0. For the discrete
time model, the service capacity km at hotspot m should be
no larger than the maximum hovering time, i.e., km ≤ B0 −
Dm −
ckm
nm
. Thus, km ≤ ⌊
B0−Dm
1+ c
nm
⌋.
In Algorithm 2 given any UAV deployment profile N , we
first compute the expected profit maxkm R
αm
km
(⌊B0 − Dm −
ckm
nm
⌋) under optimal energy allocation for each hotspot m.
Then, by comparing the overall expected profits Φ(N ) in (21)
under all possible efficient UAV deployment profiles A(N ),
the optimal UAV deployment N ∗ = argmaxN∈A(N ) Φ(N )
can be obtained. The computation complexity of Algorithm 2
is O(NMM maxm∈{1,...,M}(B0 −Dm)
2).
In the following, we further analyze whether UAVs should
all center at the first best hotspot 1 or fork to hotspot 2 (or more
hotspots), by assuming exponential distributions of users’
service valuations for the relaxed continuous-time model with
α′ as the user arrival rate of Poisson process.
Proposition 5.1: Given N ≥ 2 UAVs for M ≥ 2 hotspots,
the UAVs will fork in their deployment to serve different
hotspots rather than all centering at the first best hotspot 1
if
α′2
α′1
> max(ϕ
1
k∗
2 , ϕ), (22)
where ϕ is given in (23) and k∗2 is given in (18). The forking
condition in (22) is more likely to hold for a smaller flying
distance D2 to hotspot 2 or a larger user occurrence rate α
′
2.
The proof of Proposition 5.1 is given in Appendix E.
According to Proposition 5.1, we can see that the UAVs
are more likely to fork to serve hotspot 2 (and others) if the
latter has a similar user density α′2 and flying distance D2 as
hotspot 1.
We also wonder the impact of the number of UAVs on the
forking deployment. As a numerical example, we first apply
Algorithm 2 to consider N = 5 UAVs to be deployed to
M = 5 hotspots in Fig. 2, Fig. 7(a), and Fig. 7(b) under the
same setup. Later in Fig. 7(c), we will increase the number of
UAVs from 5 to 9. We consider users’ valuations follow the
exponential distribution with λ = 1.
• In Fig. 2, it is optimal to deploy 5 UAVs to all 5 hotspots.
As the user occurrence rates of hotspots 3, 4, 5 decrease
from Fig. 2 to Fig. 7(a), we will not serve these hotspots
but deploy 3 UAVs to hotspot 1 and 2 UAVs to hotspot
2. Now hotspot 1 (2) is the first (second) best.
• As the flying distance to hotspot 2 increases from Fig.
7(a)’s D2 = 5 to Fig. 7(b)’s D2 = 17, all the UAVs will
(a) Optimal UAV deployment profile N ∗ =
{3, 2, 0, 0, 0} among the five hotspots.
(b) Optimal UAV deployment profile N ∗ =
{5, 0, 0, 0, 0} among the five hotspots.
(c) Optimal UAV deployment profile N ∗ =
{5, 2, 1, 1, 0} among the five hotspots.
Fig. 7: Illustration of the optimal deployment of multiple UAVs to different hotspots when B0 = 20, c = 2. The number in
red circle indicates how many UAVs are assigned to the corresponding hotspot.
stop forking and only serve hotspot 1 without considering
hotspot 2. This is consistent with Proposition 5.1.
• Finally, Fig. 7(c) shows that as the number of UAVs
increases from Fig. 7(b), the UAVs fork to serve different
hotspots again. This is because when many cooperative
UAVs center at the same hotspot, they waste a lot of
energy in hovering for the same group of users as shown
in (20). Therefore, it is better for some UAVs to fork to
serve different hotspots (though distant) and meet more
demands.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first analyze the UAV’s dynamic pricing
under incomplete information including random user arrivals
and unknown service valuations. Then, given a hotspot to
deploy, the energy allocation to hovering time and service
capacity is optimized. Finally, we show the optimal UAVs’
deployment to potential hotspots.
There are some possible directions to study in the future. For
example, now we plan the UAVs’ dynamic pricing and energy
allocation strategies beforehand at the UAV station, which
saves the implementation complexity for UAVs to decide and
operate in real time. Yet given more artificial intelligence, the
UAVs in the future may learn and adapt prices to realized
user occurrence over time and decide to hover longer or
not. Another future direction is to decide the UPS provision
under minimum service requirements (e.g., minimum number
of hotspots or demands to serve) for fairness concern besides
profitability objective.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2
Under the reasonable assumption of regularity, Rk(t) in (3)
is a concave function with respect to pk(t), and the solution
pk(t) to (4) is the unique optimal price. Algorithm 1 uses this
result and the resulting dynamic pricing strategy is optimal.
As shown in Algorithm 1, given the service capacity k, for
each jth-to-last user (j = 1, ..., k), we should compute the
optimal price pj(t) and expected profit Rj(t) at each time
slot t ∈ {1, ..., T } during the hovering time T . Therefore, the
computation complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(kT ).
Then, we prove that p1(t) is a non-decreasing function of
t. If k = 1, we can simplify (4) and the optimal price p1(t)
is the unique solution to
p1(t)−
1− F (p1(t))
f(p1(t))
= R1(t− 1). (24)
Since φ(p1(t)) as the left-hand-side of (24) increases with
p1(t), the optimal price p1(t) increases with R1(t− 1). Note
that R1(t) ≥ R1(t− 1). Therefore, p1(t) is a non-decreasing
function of t.
Finally, we prove that p1(t) is a non-decreasing function of
α. According to (24), the optimal expected profit in (1) can
be rewritten as
R1(t) = p1(t)−
1− F (p1(t))
f(p1(t))
(1− α(1 − F (p1(t)))). (25)
Taking the derivative of R1(t) with respect to p1(t), we have
dR1(t)
dp1(t)
=(1− α(1 − F (p1(t))))
× (2 +
(1− F (p1(t)))f ′(p1(t))
f2(p1(t))
).
(26)
Since φ(p1(t)) increases with p1(t), i.e.,
dφ(p1(t))
dp1(t)
> 0, we
have 2+ (1−F (p1(t)))f
′(p1(t))
f2(p1(t))
> 0 in (26). Note that 1−α(1−
F (p1(t))) > 0. Therefore,
dR1(t)
dp1(t)
> 0, i.e., R1(t) increases
with p1(t).
Since R1(0) = 0, by optimizing R1(1) = αp1(1)(1 −
F (p1(1))), we can see that the optimal price p1(1) is not a
function of α and R1(1) linearly increases with α. According
to (24), p1(2) increases with R1(1) as p1(t) −
1−F (p1(t))
f(p1(t))
increases with p1(t), which means that p1(2) also increases
with α. As we discussed in the last paragraph,R1(2) increases
with p1(2), which means that R1(2) also increases with α.
Similarly, according to (24), p1(3) increases with R1(2),
which means that p1(3) increases with α. An iterative analysis
shows that p1(t) for any t is a non-decreasing function of α.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3
Note that
∑k
i=0
1
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e
)i
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e
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e
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e
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1
i!
(α
′
e
)i 1
tk−i
, which is increasing in t. Then, according
to (10), we have pk(t) increases with t.
In the following, we will prove that pk(t) decreases with k.
To prove pk(t) ≥ pk+1(t), we only need to prove∑k
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i∑k−1
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i
≥
∑k+1
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i∑k
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i
, (27)
which is equivalent to prove
1
k!
(
α′t
e
)k
1
(k + 1)!
(
α′t
e
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≥(
1
(k + 1)!
(
α′t
e
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1
k!
(
α′t
e
)k)
k∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′t
e
)i.
(28)
Multiply both side of (28) with (k + 1)! and ( e
α′t
)k, we can
rewrite (28) as
(k + 1)
k∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′t
e
)i ≥
k−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′t
e
)i+1
=
k∑
i=1
1
(i− 1)!
(
α′t
e
)i.
(29)
Note that (k + 1)
∑k
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i >
∑k
i=0
1
(i−1)! (
α′t
e
)i >∑k
i=1
1
(i−1)! (
α′t
e
)i. Therefore, (29) always holds, which means
the optimal price decreases with k. We can also verify that
2pk(t) ≤ pk+1(t) + pk−1(t), which shows that the optimal
price decreases with k convexly.
To prove that Rk(t) is a concave with k, we only need to
show that
Rk+1(t) +Rk−1(t) ≤ 2Rk(t). (30)
Insert (9) into (30), it is equivalent to prove
1
k!
(
α′t
e
)k
1
(k + 1)!
(
α′t
e
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≥(
1
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(
α′t
e
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e
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1
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(
α′t
e
)i,
which is same as (28) and the proof is done.
Then, we will show that Rk(t) is a concave with t, which
is equivalent to show
∂2Rk(t)
∂t2
< 0. By taking the second
derivative of Rk(t) with respect to t, we have
∂2Rk(t)
∂t2
=
α′2
λe2
∑k−2
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i
∑k
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1
i! (
α′t
e
)i − (
∑k−1
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i)2
(
∑k
i=0
1
i! (
α′t
e
)i)2
.
(31)
Since Rk(t) is a concave with k, we have
k−2∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′t
e
)i
k∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′t
e
)i − (
k−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′t
e
)i)2 < 0. (32)
Therefore,
∂2Rk(t)
∂t2
< 0 always holds.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
As shown in Section III-A, the expected profit for hovering
time t and the corresponding optimal price are given in (9) and
(10), respectively. When α′ ≤ 2ce(B−2c)2 , we have R1(B− c) ≥
R2(B−2c). Then, we proveRk−1(B−c(k−1)) ≥ Rk(B−ck)
for any k > 2 under the condition α′ ≤ 2ce(B−2c)2 . Since
Rk(B − ck)−Rk−1(B − c(k − 1))
=
1
λ
log(
∑k
i=0
1
i! (
α′(B−ck)
e
)i∑k−1
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1
i! (
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e
)i
),
(33)
we only need to show
k∑
i=1
1
i!
(
α′(B − ck)
e
)i ≤
k−1∑
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1
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(
α′(B − c(k − 1))
e
)i. (34)
For k = 3, B must be larger than 3c. According to α′ ≤
2ce
(B−2c)2 , we have
3∑
i=1
1
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e
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− 2c+
c(B − 3c)2
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≤
2c2
3(B − 2c)
− c.
(35)
Since B ≥ 3c, we have 2c
2
3(B−2c)−c < 0. Therefore, R2(B−
2c) > R3(B − 3c).
For k ≥ 4, i.e., B must be larger than 4c, we only need to
prove if
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we can show that
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Note that B ≥ 4c. Thus, 2ici − i!c(B − 2c)i−1 ≤ 2ici −
i!2i−1ci = 2ici(1 − i!2 ). Since 1 −
i!
2 ≤ 0 for i ≥ 2, we have
(2c)i
(B−2c)i−1i! − c ≤ 0 for any i ≥ 2. When i = 1, it is easy
to check that the third equation of (36) is negative. Therefore,
we have Rk−1(B − c(k − 1)) ≥ Rk(B − ck) for any k > 1
when α′ ≤ 2ce(B−2c)2 .
Then, we consider the case when α′ > 2ce(B−2c)2 , i.e.,
R1(B−c) < R2(B−2c). Since the left-hand side of equation
(15) is increasing with α′ and the right-hand side is decreasing
with α′, the solution α¯′ is unique. Note that (15) can be rewrite
as
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Therefore, when α′ ≥ α¯′, we have R⌊B
c
⌋(B − c⌊
B
c
⌋) ≥
R⌊B
c
⌋−1(B − c(⌊
B
c
⌋ − 1)). Then, we prove Rk−1(B − c(k −
1)) ≥ Rk−2(B − c(k − 2)) for any k given Rk(B − ck) ≥
Rk−1(B − c(k − 1)).
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we have
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B − ck
>0.
(39)
Therefore, we have Rk(B − ck) ≥ Rk−1(B − c(k − 1)) for
any k if α′ ≥ α¯′.
If α′ < α¯′, we have R⌊B
c
⌋(B − c⌊
B
c
⌋) < R⌊B
c
⌋−1(B −
c(⌊B
c
⌋ − 1)). Since R1(B − c) < R2(B − 2c), there exists a
k∗ ∈ {2, · · · , ⌊B
c
⌋−1} such that k∗ = argmaxk Rk(B− ck).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
Given any two hotspots in the network, if the UAV will
always serve only one hotspot rather than both of them, we can
conclude that the UAV will always serve only one hotspot with
maximum expected profit. Therefore, in the following, we will
only consider two hotspots here and generally consider that the
UAV will pass by closer hotspot 1 first and then hotspot 2. For
any energy allocation to the hotspots B1 and B2, the optimal
expected profit of hotspot j, j ∈ {1, 2} is
R
α′j
kˆj
(Bj − ckˆj) =
1
λ
log
( kˆj∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′j(Bj − ckˆj)
e
)i
)
, (40)
where kˆj = argmaxkj R
α′j
kj
(Bj − ckj), j ∈ {1, 2}.
First, we consider the case that R
α′1
k∗1
(B01−ck
∗
1) ≥ R
α′2
k∗2
(B02−
ck∗2), i.e., the optimal expected profit of hotspot 1 is larger
than that of hotspot 2 if the UAV chooses to serve only one
hotspot, where B01 = B0 − D1, B
0
2 = B0 − D2, and k
∗
i =
argmaxki R
α′i
ki
(B0i −cki), i ∈ {1, 2}. Obviously,D1,2 ≥ B
0
1−
B02 .
Note that R
α′1
k∗1
(B01 − ck
∗
1) ≥ R
α′2
k∗2
(B02 − ck
∗
2) and k
∗
1 , k
∗
2 are
the optimal energy allocation, we have
log(
k∗1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′1(B
0
1 − ck
∗
1)
e
)i) ≥ log(
k∗2∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′2(B
0
2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i)
≥ log(
k∗1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′2(B
0
2 − ck
∗
1)
e
)i).
(41)
As the numbers of summation terms in R
α′i
k∗1
(B0i − ck
∗
1), i =
1, 2 given in (9) are the same, we have
α′1(B
0
1−ck
∗
1)
e
≥
α′2(B
0
2−ck
∗
1)
e
for each summation term according to R
α′2
k∗1
(B02 −
ck∗1) ≤ R
α′1
k∗1
(B01 − ck
∗
1). If α
′
1 < α
′
2, we have D1,2 ≥ (B
0
2 −
ck∗1)(
α′2
α′1
− 1) due to D1,2 ≥ B01 −B
0
2 . Note that it is assumed
that the hovering time increases in the energy allocated to the
hotspot and the optimal service capacity k¯i increases in α
′
i
for any given energy budget. Thus, B02 − ck
∗
1 ≥ B2 − ck¯1
and B2 − ck¯1 ≥ B2 − ckˆ2 due to α′1 < α
′
2. Therefore, we
have D1,2 ≥ (B02 − ck
∗
1)(
α′2
α′1
− 1) ≥ (B2 − ckˆ2)(
α′2
α′1
− 1). By
comparing each summation term in R
α′1
kˆ2
(B2+D1,2−ckˆ2) and
R
α′2
kˆ2
(B2 − ckˆ2), we have
R
α′1
kˆ2
(B2 +D1,2 − ckˆ2) ≥ R
α′2
kˆ2
(B2 − ckˆ2). (42)
Since kˆ1, kˆ2 are the optimal energy allocation for each
hotspot, we have
R
α′1
kˆ1
(B2 +D1,2 − ckˆ1) ≥ R
α′1
kˆ2
(B2 +D1,2 − ckˆ2). (43)
Thus, according to (42) and (43), we have R
α′1
kˆ1
(B2 +D1,2 −
ckˆ1) ≥ R
α′2
kˆ2
(B2 − ckˆ2), which shows that it is better for the
UAV to only serve hotspot 1.
If α′1 ≥ α
′
2, we can see that (42) always holds, and the
hotspot 1 with shorter flying distance and larger user demand
is superior to hotspot 2.
For the case R
α′2
k∗2
(B02−ck
∗
2) > R
α′1
k∗1
(B01−ck
∗
1), the analysis
is similar as above. In this case, actually it is easier to prove
hotspot 2 will keep all energy rather than sharing with hotspot
1. Therefore, we can conclude that it is better for the UAV
to only serve the hotspot with maximum individual expected
profit.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1
Note that we sort the hotspots by their expected profits
received from a single UAV. Thus, if all UAVs choose to jointly
serve the same hotspot, they will choose hotspot 1 and the
corresponding expected profit is maxk1 R
α′1
k1
(B0 −D1−
ck1
N
).
If the overall expected profit received from serving both
hotspots 1 and 2 is larger than maxk1 R
α′1
k1
(B0 −D1 −
ck1
N
),
the cooperative UAVs will definitely fork to serve different
hotspots. Specifically, the sufficient condition can be written
as
max
k1
R
α′1
k1
(B0 −D1 −
ck1
N
)
<max
k1
R
α′1
k1
(B0 −D1 −
ck1
N − 1
) +R
α′2
k∗2
(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2).
(44)
According to (9), we only need to show
max
k1
k1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′1(B0 −D1 −
ck1
N
)
e
)i
<(max
k1
k1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′1(B0 −D1 −
ck1
N−1 )
e
)i)
× (
k∗2∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′2(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i).
(45)
Denote β1 =
α′2
α′1
. If β1 ∈ (0, 1], we have
k∗2∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′2(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i
>1 + β
k∗2
1
k∗2∑
i=1
1
i!
(
α′1(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i.
(46)
Therefore, when
maxk1
∑k1
i=0
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D1−
ck1
N
)
e
)i
maxk1
∑k1
i=0
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D1−
ck1
N−1
)
e
)i
<1 + β
k∗2
1
k∗2∑
i=1
1
i!
(
α′1(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i,
(47)
(44) always holds.
If β1 > 1, we have
k∗2∑
i=0
1
i!
(
α′2(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i
>1 + β1
k∗2∑
i=1
1
i!
(
α′1(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i.
(48)
Therefore, when
maxk1
∑k1
i=0
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D1−
ck1
N
)
e
)i
maxk1
∑k1
i=0
1
i! (
α′1(B0−D1−
ck1
N−1
)
e
)i
<1 + β1
k∗2∑
i=1
1
i!
(
α′1(B0 −D2 − ck
∗
2)
e
)i,
(49)
(44) always holds.
By solving (47) and (49), we obtain the sufficient condition
α′2
α′1
> max(ϕ
1
k∗
2 , ϕ) as in the proposition.
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